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ABSTRACT 
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is one of the most studied psychological 
disorders in psychology, and it is also one of the most detrimental to the individual. 
Research on BPD has consistently found that those with the disorder often experience 
volatile interpersonal interactions, and several areas of research have been dedicated to 
the understanding of the mechanisms behind these interpersonal struggles. One of the 
most common theories is that emotion dysregulation and affective instability, two core 
traits of BPD, may impact these interpersonal interactions in a negative manner.  
Several researchers have attempted to identify how those with BPD perceive the 
emotional states of others, but have obtained mixed results. The purpose of the current 
study was to examine emotion perception in those with borderline personality features 
using a paradigm which has not been used in any of the existing literature, as well as to 
explore the differences between the effects of mood state and personality traits on 
emotion perception, as those with BPD experience high levels of negative mood. A 
modified version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task was utilized in combination 
with a mood induction method and a measure of borderline personality to determine the 
roles of both affective state and personality traits in emotion perception. 
Results indicated that although mood was unable to be effectively manipulated in 
the current sample, several findings emerged which offer support to various theories of 
the potential mechanisms behind emotion perception in BPD, including evidence for 
impulsivity as a potential influencing factor in accurate emotion perception. In addition, 
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the current study highlights key areas of future research which may provide a greater 
understanding of how both affect and personality traits influence the interpersonal 
experiences of those with BPD. An examination of the results, potential mechanisms 
behind study findings, and future directions are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a disorder characterized by identity 
disturbance, emotional instability, impulsivity, and self-injurious/suicidal behavior. It is 
also noted for the difficulty individuals with BPD have with emotion regulation, 
particularly in interpersonal interactions (Linehan, 1993; McGlashan et al., 2005). 
Relationship difficulties are common with BPD, and individuals with BPD are highly 
sensitive to situations involving rejection or failure (Kernberg, 1984). Of particular 
concern is the finding that many of the most severe problems associated with BPD (i.e., 
self-harming behaviors) are often manifested within the context of interpersonal 
interactions (Brodsky, Groves, Oquendo, Mann, & Stanley, 2006; Chapman & Dixon-
Gordon, 2007; Ebner-Priemer et al., 2007; Herpertz, 1995; Leichsenring, Kunst, & 
Hoyer, 2003; Lejuez et al., 2003; Stiglmayr et al., 2005; Welch & Linehan, 2002). 
Because of the strong association between interpersonal interactions and 
deleterious borderline personality behaviors, many researchers have theorized that 
emotion dysregulation and fear of social rejection are core mechanisms of BPD 
(Kernberg, 1984; Linehan, 1987; Linehan, 1993; Linehan, 1995). Linehan’s (1993) 
biosocial theory of BPD suggests that individuals with BPD have a biological 
vulnerability to emotion dysregulation and experience higher baseline levels of negative 
affect and a heightened reactivity to negative social stimuli. Kuo and Linehan (2009) 
found, however, that BPD may not be characterized by heightened emotional reactivity 
(based on physiological data), but instead by a higher than average level of self-reported 
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emotional intensity. At the time of this writing, this trend was also shown in another 
study which examined how susceptible patients with BPD were to a negative mood 
induction when compared to healthy controls, finding that those with BPD did not react 
any more quickly or obtain a greater effect from a negative mood induction procedure 
than healthy controls, although they did report higher levels of baseline negative affect 
(Feliu-Soler, Pascual, Soler, Pérez, Armario, Carrasco, Sanz, … Borràs, 2013). 
Several researchers have suggested that impaired social cognition is a primary 
component of BPD (Bateman & Fonagy, 2003; Bender & Skodol, 2007; Levy, 2005; 
Levy et al., 2006; Westen, 1991). One theory is that the difficulties individuals with 
BPD experience in social interactions is due to their own problems with mentalization, 
which is referred to as the ability to understand the emotions of oneself and others 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2003). Another theory is that social interaction problems stem from 
the inability of those with BPD to differentiate between different emotions, which 
creates emotion dysregulation and inappropriate social responses (Linehan, 1993). 
Though the mechanics behind these theories may differ, the common theme between 
these theories is that the trouble that individuals with BPD have with their own emotions 
somehow influences their social interactions with others, often in negative ways. Social 
interactions rely on the ability of both parties being able to adequately recognize and 
process social cues and emotional information, and BPD is characterized by an increased 
awareness of and vigilance towards social information (Linehan, 1995). However, those 
with BPD often have trouble with their ability to process social stimuli, and since this 
ability is used to infer appropriate behavior in a given social situation, any errors in 
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judgment with regards to the emotional state of others can cause problems with 
behavioral responses during interactions, which in turn can create awkward or tense 
social situations that can lead to social rejection. Thus, the combination of a 
hypervigilance for social cues and the inability to accurately interpret them create a 
recipe for social disaster. 
Within the past two decades, there has been an increase in research examining 
emotion perception and recognition abilities in those with BPD. It is well-established 
that certain psychiatric disorders are associated with impaired emotion recognition 
abilities, such as autism or schizophrenia, and some suggest that the same may be true of 
BPD (Bolte & Poustka, 2003; Kohler et al., 2003). One of the most popular methods of 
assessing emotion perception is by using facial expression affect recognition. Facial 
expression recognition relies on the ability of individuals to decode the mental states of 
others based on facial cues, such as smiling, frowning, raising the eyebrows, exposing 
the teeth, etc., from photographs of different faces. Facial expression affect recognition 
tasks use stimuli that have been selected based on the notion that only one emotion label 
is correct for any given particular facial expression, and usually involve having 
individuals label emotional facial expressions. Accuracy is determined by the percentage 
of correct emotion labeling of facial expressions, with incorrect emotion labels counting 
as a misidentification.  
 There have been numerous studies examining the ability of individuals with BPD 
to accurately perceive emotions in others. However, the literature in this area reports 
results that vary widely from study to study (Domes, Schulze, & Herpertz, 2009). For 
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example, a study by Levine, Marziali, and Hood (1997) found that individuals with BPD 
were less accurate at labeling facial affects than healthy controls, a finding also 
supported in a later study (Bland, Williams, Scharer, & Manning, 2004). In contrast, 
other studies have found that individuals with BPD are actually more accurate than 
healthy controls at detecting certain emotional states (Wagner & Linehan, 1999; Lynch, 
Rosenthal, Kosson, Cheavens, LeJuez, & Blair, 2006). One study found that individuals 
with BPD were only impaired at accurately recognizing facial expressions if the 
expressions were complex (Minzenberg, Poole, & Vinogradov, 2006), while another 
study found that individuals with BPD were only impaired if they were required to 
distinguish between negative and neutral facial expressions as quickly as possible (Dyck 
et al., 2009). 
 A possible explanation for these discrepancies is that individuals with BPD may 
actually experience a more subtle deficit in emotion recognition as opposed to an overall 
impairment. Several studies have found that individuals with BPD differ most from 
healthy controls when dealing with negative emotions, though whether this difference is 
attributable to a perceptual advantage or disadvantage is a topic of debate. For example, 
Wagner and Linehan (1999) found that overall, individuals with BPD performed at least 
as well as healthy controls on an emotion recognition task, suggesting no impairment, 
but in addition, when examined on the level of specific emotions those with BPD were 
actually more accurate than controls for expressions of fear. However, other studies have 
found conflicting results—for example, Levine, Marziali, and Hood (1997) found that 
individuals with BPD were impaired at the accurate perception of negative emotions. 
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One explanation for this inconsistency is that BPD may be characterized by a negativity 
“bias” rather than an improved accuracy for negative emotions, resulting in an 
apparently increased accuracy for negative emotions at the cost of being less accurate at 
other emotions, such as neutral or positive (Domes et al., 2008; Donegan et al., 2003; 
Dyck et al., 2009; Lynch et al., 2006; Meyer, Pilkonis, & Beevers, 2004; Silbersweig et 
al., 2007; Wagner & Linehan, 1999). However, the majority of studies examining facial 
expression recognition with BPD have all used facial expression paradigms using the 
entire face, which is prone to several issues. 
While facial expression recognition tasks are some of the most commonly used 
measures of emotion perception in research, they tend to be rather easy for the majority 
of healthy individuals, with most individuals being able to accurately perceive facial 
expressions of emotion beginning at age 6 (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). This can 
create a ceiling effect, which can prevent researchers from obtaining a true measurement 
of ability. For example, if someone who has average emotion perception skills can still 
manage to get every item correct on a facial expression recognition task, then someone 
who has above-average emotion perception skills will not be able to be differentiated 
from those with average abilities. In addition, facial expression paradigms which use the 
entire face may be more confusing to individuals completing the task, as there may be 
conflicting information in an entire face that would not be present if the expression 
consisted of only the eyes. For example, a forced smile typically lacks the duchenne 
marks (crow’s feet) around the eyes that would signify a true smile accompanying 
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happiness, and the same is true regarding many other emotions as well, though with 
different facial muscles (Ekman, 1993). This is because true emotions result in facial 
expressions that involve complex muscle groups in the face which cannot be deliberately 
created and are involuntary. Thus, a facial expression recognition task involving the 
entire face in which the stimuli were created from actors asked to display prototypic 
emotional expressions (the most common method) could be affectively complex, as the 
face would display different expressions in different areas of the face (in the case of a 
forced smile, a positive expression around the mouth but a more neutral expression 
around the eyes). 
In an attempt to overcome the issue of a ceiling effect in full-face emotion 
expression recognition paradigms, a new emotion perception task was developed, known 
as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task, or 
RMET, was developed in 1997 by Simon Baron-Cohen and colleagues in order to assess 
individuals’ abilities to pick up on subtle emotional cues, and revised in 2001 (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, 
& Plumb, 2001). The RMET is based on the premise of perception of emotional states in 
others through the eyes, and evidence has shown that humans are capable of accurately 
decoding complex emotional states from the eyes of others in addition to the six basic 
and universal emotions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997). The RMET 
consists of a series of black-and-white sectional photographs of human faces, 
specifically the eye region (see Figure 1). Because the RMET stimuli consist only of 
photographs of the eye region of the face, it forces participants to attend to more subtle  
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Figure 1. An example of the standard RMET stimuli1 
 
 
 
cues in determining the emotional state of the individual in the photograph, allowing for 
a more accurate method of differentiating the accuracy of different individuals who 
complete the RMET. In addition, the RMET allows for better control over the valence of 
the emotion being displayed, since it focuses on a single region of the face, and would 
not be as susceptible to conflicting expressions. 
However, the RMET does have issues to consider. For example, the response 
format of the RMET asks participants to choose one of four different words indicating 
emotional states to describe each set of eyes. The possible choices are usually very 
complex emotional words that may not have a clear affective valence, such as “insisting” 
or “contemplative”. In addition, the eye stimuli used in the RMET were photographs of 
faces culled from magazines, and so the photographs themselves do not display 
prototypic emotional states, and because the individuals in the photographs were not 
                                                 
1 All RMET stimuli are available online at: http://www.autismresearchcentre.com/arc_tests (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) 
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asked to simulate any particular emotion, the  “correct” emotional valence of each 
photograph is subjective—typically, the RMET stimuli have been classified into 
positive, negative, and neutral categories based on consensus ratings from pilot data in 
the past (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005; Scott, Levy, Adams, 
& Stevenson, 2011). These issues do not necessarily represent problems with the RMET 
(and indeed, the lack of simulated emotions increases the task’s validity as a measure of 
emotion perception), but they do present potential challenges for the use of the RMET as 
a method of determining response biases.   
At present, only two studies have been published using an eyes-only facial 
expression recognition paradigm among individuals with borderline personality features 
(Fertuck et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2011). Of note is the fact that even though these two 
studies used almost identical study designs, the results were different, such that one 
study (Fertuck et al., 2009) found that those with high borderline personality features 
exhibited enhanced accuracy overall, whereas the other study (Scott et al., 2011) found 
that the high and low borderline personality features groups did not significantly differ 
on any emotional valence other than negative emotion, in which individuals in the high 
borderline features group were more accurate than the low borderline features group for 
negative emotions. In addition, individuals in the high borderline features group tended 
to choose more negatively-valenced word choices overall when compared to the low 
borderline features group, suggesting a possible negativity bias. However, the disparity 
between these two studies, combined with the inconsistencies reported in other facial 
recognition with BPD studies, suggest that this is an area where further study is 
 9 
 
necessary. The present study extends this line of research, using a methodology that may 
be better able to differentiate bias and accuracy in emotion recognition. 
The current study sought to expand on the advantages provided by the RMET by 
only using the eye region of the face instead of the face as a whole for use as stimuli, 
applying this approach to other established facial affect recognition measures. Ekman 
and Friesen (1976) created a widely-used set of facial stimuli he called the “Pictures of 
Facial Affect” (PFA). These pictures consist of photographs taken from Dr. Ekman’s 
studies on the universality of facial emotion expressions, and represent objectively coded 
emotional states. In addition, another set of facial stimuli known as the NimStim Set of 
Facial Expressions (NimStim; Tottenham et al., 2002) consists of over 600 facial stimuli 
established in a manner very similar to the method used by Ekman (i.e., professional 
actors were asked to display a variety of clear emotions). Both the PFA and the NimStim 
stimuli sets allow for a much greater level of control over the types of emotions being 
displayed, in addition to a greater, more objective level of confidence in the actual 
emotions being presented. 
As the purpose of this study is to examine facial expression perception abilities 
among those with borderline personality features and determine if a negativity bias 
exists, the study consisted of a two-part performance task. For the first part, participants 
completed a standard facial expression perception task, and in the second part they 
completed a memory task. Previous research has shown that memory disturbances may 
be a characteristic of BPD (Korfine & Hooley, 2000; Kurtz & Morey, 1999), and the 
memory task is used in order to explore the effects of a potential negativity bias on 
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memory. If a bias exists, it may affect one's recall of social situations so that they are 
remembered differently than they actually were. At least one study has shown that there 
may exist a negative recall pattern in BPD, such that individuals with BPD have a 
tendency to remember past events as more negative than they actually were (Ebner-
Priemer et al., 2006). There is a good deal of research supporting the theory of mood-
congruent memory, which states that individuals are more likely to recall past 
information that is congruent with their current mood as opposed to past information 
incongruent with their current mood (Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; Laird, Wagener, 
Halal, & Szegda, 1982; Rusting, 1998; Rusting, 1999). Thus, if a negativity bias is 
present it could affect accurate recall of facial expressions seen in the past. This has 
important implications, as a negative recall bias could perpetuate a negative mood state, 
since one adaptive strategy to overcome negative mood states is to recall positive events 
(Rusting & DeHart, 2000). In addition to the facial expression recognition task and the 
memory task, the current study also made use of a mood induction task. 
The mood induction task is an important addition to this project, as it allows for 
the study of state effects on perception. BPD is characterized by negative emotionality, 
and a heightened baseline level of negative emotions (Jacob et al., 2009; Linehan, 1993). 
As such, it is worth determining what role (if any) this emotional arousal plays in the 
perception abilities of BPD. Like memory, research has shown that mood state can 
influence the perception of events and others (Blaney, 1986; Forgas, 1994; Rusting, 
1998), and that individuals tend to evaluate situations and events in a manner that 
matches their internal mood state (Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). While 
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the research on the effects of emotion manipulation on perception of facial expressions 
in BPD is scarce, there is research which suggests that mood can in fact play a role in 
emotion perception abilities (Brigham, Maass, & Martinez, 1983; Hills & Lewis, 2011). 
Thus, if a negativity bias exists in BPD, it's possible it is due not to borderline 
personality traits directly, but instead by mood state. It's also possible that any deficits in 
emotion perception ability are influenced by the interaction of personality and mood 
state (Rusting, 1999). In other words, it may not be as simple as negative moods causing 
negative perceptions, but may instead be that personality traits and mood state interact to 
influence perceptions. For example, a highly neurotic individual may more readily 
perceive situations as negative during a neutral mood state than a less neurotic individual 
would during a similar mood state, while both types of individuals might respond 
similarly during negative emotional states. 
The present study used facial stimuli from the RMET, the PFA, and the NimStim 
stimulus sets using the eye-paradigm introduced by the RMET in an attempt to explore 
the hypothesized variability in the emotion identification and memory abilities of 
different groups of individuals, including those in an induced negative mood state, an 
induced neutral mood state, and with varying degrees of endorsement of borderline 
personality features. In addition to the benefits provided by the wide variety of 
empirically validated stimuli, the current study also had the benefit of the use of a signal-
detection paradigm in order to examine both accuracy and response bias in participants’ 
responses. As it is crucial to distinguish between an impairment or a bias, a signal-
detection design can allow for a straight-forward examination of any negativity biases 
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that may exist by simplifying the response options for participants into “yes” or “no” 
answers.  
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2.  METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants were 213 undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course at Texas A&M University. Students enrolled in this course were also 
enrolled in a subject pool from which recruitment took place. Participants included 98 
females, 76 males, and 39 participants for which gender data was not available. The 
majority of participants were Caucasian (54.9%, n = 117), with other ethnicities reported 
including Hispanic/Latino (14.1%, n = 30), Asian (6.1%, n = 13), African 
American/Black (3.8%, n = 8), Middle Eastern (.9%, n = 2), Native American/Alaskan 
(.5%, n = 1), and Other (1.4%, n = 3). Ethnicity information was unavailable for 39 
participants. The mean age of participants was 18 (SD = .946). Participants were divided 
into two groups via random assignment, consisting of the experimental group (n = 106) 
and the control group (n = 107).  
2.2  Measures 
 2.2.1  Personality Assessment Inventory – Borderline Scale. The Borderline 
Scale (BOR) of the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991) was used to 
assess for borderline personality features in all participants. The PAI has been used in 
several studies with undergraduate populations, and displays strong psychometric 
properties (Chapman et al., 2008; Trull, 1995, 2001). The PAI-BOR asks 24 questions 
related to the symptomatology of borderline personality disorder, with each item rated 
using a 4-option response format including False, Slightly True, Mainly True, and Very 
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True. Test takers are given a T-score which can be used to separate participants into high 
and low borderline personality features groups based on established cutoffs, or T-scores 
can beviewed continuously. In addition to a total score for borderline personality 
features, the PAI-BOR has four subscales for which separate T-scores can be calculated, 
including affective instability (BOR-A), identity problems (BOR-I), negative 
relationships (BOR-N), and self-harm (BOR-S). 
 2.2.2  Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale 20 (TAS-
20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) is a 20-item questionnaire designed to assess for the 
presence of alexithymia, or the inability to accurately identify emotions and emotional 
states. As this study focuses on emotion perception, the inclusion of a measure for 
alexithymia was an appropriate method of further differentiating potential problems with 
emotion identification. The TAS-20 is a very common instrument for the assessment of 
alexithymic individuals, and has been well-validated since its inception (Bagby, Taylor, 
& Parker, 1994; Parker, Taylor, & Bagby, 2003; Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 2003). The 
TAS-20 contains 3 subscales: a scale used for Difficulty Describing Feelings (TAS-20-
DDF), a scale used for Difficulty Identifying Feelings (TAS-20-DIF), and a scale used 
for Externally-Oriented Thinking (TAS-20-EOT). Each of the subscales are measured by 
the sum of each item in the scale, with items rated using a 5-point Likert scale. A 
designation of alexithymia is assigned for total TAS-20 scores above 60. 
 2.2.3  Self-Assessment Manikin. Self-Assessment Manikins (SAM; Lang, 1980) 
allow test takers to rate their current affect on a scale of 1 to 9 accompanied by visual 
depictions of each level of emotion. These visual depictions are presented using a 
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graphic representation of varying states of emotional reactivity, with one end being 
neutral or near-neutral, and the other end being very emotionally aroused. This study 
used Arousal and Happiness SAMs, asking participants to rate their arousal from calm to 
excited, and their happiness from unhappy to happy (with 1 being Happy and 9 being 
Unhappy for Happiness, and 1 being Aroused and 9 being Calm for Arousal). The SAM 
was used as a manipulation check for the mood induction tasks. The scales were given to 
participants when they arrived to obtain a baseline measurement of affect, and then again 
following the mood induction. Additionally, the SAM was given after the eyes task to 
help identify any possible effects the facial expression task itself may have had on 
participant affect. 
 2.2.4  The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a 20-item instrument 
designed to measure both positive and negative affect states and traits. Each item asks 
the degree to which the respondent has felt a particular emotion within a definitive time 
frame using a 5-point scale which ranges from very slightly or not at all (1) to extremely 
(5). The PANAS has two subscales, with 10 items comprising both the negative affect 
subscale and positive affect subscale. The PANAS is included in the present study in 
order to obtain a measure of more trait-like affect in participants. Those participants high 
in borderline personality features should display higher negative affect over a longer 
period of time than those low in borderline personality features. The PANAS was 
administered at three separate points during study administration: the first at the start of 
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the task before presentation of any stimuli, the second following the administration of 
the mood induction task, and the third following the completion of the perception task. 
 2.2.5  Facial Expression Recognition Task. This study used pictures from three 
different facial expression recognition designs: the RMET, the PFA, and the NimStim 
face sets. Because the RMET and PFA photographs are in black-and-white only, all 
NimStim photographs were edited to appear in black-and-white as well. The PFA and 
NimStim faces were cropped to only display the eye region of each facial stimulus, in 
accordance with the style of the RMET stimuli. Affective ratings are available for all 
three face sets, as well, which have been empirically tested and cross-validated (Ekman, 
1976; Scott et al., 2011; Tottenham et al., 2009). The facial expression recognition task 
was divided into two parts: a perception task in which participants were tasked with 
identifying if the emotion was negative or not, and a memory task in which participants 
were tasked with identifying whether a particular eyes-photograph had been shown 
during the perception task. 
2.3  Procedure 
 All measures were presented using a computerized administration method using 
MediaLab (Jarvis, 2007). Participants were provided with informed consent upon arrival 
and then asked to complete the PAI-BOR and the TAS-20, followed by the PANAS and 
the first administration of the SAM scales. Participants were then given either the 
negative or neutral mood induction task respective to their group (experimental or 
control). This was followed by the second administration of the SAM scales. Participants 
were then asked to complete the facial expression perception task where they were 
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shown facial expressions from a combination of RMET, PFA, and NimStim stimuli and 
asked whether each eye-photograph was displaying a negative emotion or not, 
responding with either a “yes” or a “no” by pressing corresponding keys on a keyboard. 
The facial stimuli from all three face sets were presented in a random order. Each task 
had a total of 44 stimuli that were presented. There were an equal number of negative 
and neutral stimuli for the perception task, while the memory task had slightly more 
stimuli that had been shown previously (n = 24) than had not (n = 20) due to limitations 
on the quantity of RMET stimuli. 
Following the completion of the perception task, participants completed the third 
administration of the SAM scales and a second administration of the PANAS. Finally, 
participants completed a memory task using the facial expression recognition face sets. 
The computer presented stimuli used in the previously administered perception task, but 
also displayed new stimuli that were not presented before. These additional stimuli 
consisted of eye-photographs from the RMET, PFA, and NimStim that were unused in 
the perception task. Participants were tasked with determining whether each photograph 
was new or old by responding with either a “yes” or a “no” when asked if they had seen 
that particular stimulus in the previous task. Participants were then thanked and 
debriefed. 
2.3.1  Mood Induction Tasks. Two separate mood induction tasks were used: a 
negative mood induction and a neutral mood induction. The negative mood induction 
task used a scripted imaginal induction where participants were asked to listen to an 
audio-recorded scenario and imagine themselves as the subject of the scenario in as 
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much detail as possible. The scenario described in the negative mood induction describes 
a series of social rejections designed to elicit an array of negative affect typical to that 
experienced by individuals with BPD. This procedure has been used with undergraduate 
samples in the past, and has been shown to be effective at inducing a range of negative 
emotions (Robins, 1988; Dixon-Gordon, Chapman, Lovasz, & Walters, 2011). 
The neutral mood induction task also consisted of a scripted, audio-recorded 
scenario which described a Saturday morning in which the participant imagined 
completing several everyday tasks, and was a compilation of neutral scripts adapted 
from separate neutral induction scripts that have been shown in prior research to elicit 
neither an increase in negative or positive affect (Maude-Griffin & Tiffany, 1996; 
Tiffany & Drobes, 1990). These scripts were chosen due to their similarity in style to the 
negative mood induction scripts and their effectiveness as mood-neutral induction 
techniques. Both negative and neutral induction scripts are included in Appendix A. 
2.4  Data Analyses 
In order to fully explore the relationships between BPD, mood, and emotion 
perception, two methods of identifying accuracy and bias were utilized. The first method 
relies on SDT. Signal detection is effective at distinguishing any possible response 
biases that may exist, as well as sensitivity. SDT primarily uses two statistics: the 
discriminability index, or d’ (d-prime), which is a measure of sensitivity towards the 
stimuli, and the criterion, or C, which can be used to measure response tendencies. In 
practice, d’ can an effective measure of accuracy, and C is useful for identifying whether 
a response bias is present or not by identifying the minimum criterion necessary for the 
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participant to respond “signal present”, with a low C value interpreted as a greater 
tendency to endorse a signal as present. Because the present study asked “yes” or “no” 
questions during both parts of the eyes task (perception and memory), it was possible to 
calculate both d’ and C since SDT relies on a signal-present vs. signal-absent response 
style, with data in the form of hit rates, false alarm rates, misses, and correct rejections. 
"Hit Rate" refers to the number of correctly positive responses (i.e., the signal is present 
and the participant endorses it as present), "False Alarm Rate" refers to the number of 
incorrectly positive responses (i.e., the signal is absent and the participant endorses it as 
present), "Misses" refer to the number of incorrectly endorsed negative responses (i.e., 
the signal is present and the participant endorses it as absent), and "Correct Rejections" 
refer to the number of correctly endorsed negative responses (i.e., the signal is absent 
and the participant endorses it as absent). Although d’ can be a measure of accuracy, it is 
distinct from the simplest method of determining accuracy (i.e., percentage of correct 
responses) in that the calculation of d’ requires both hit rate and false alarm rate, and 
thus SDT is able to provide information about potential response biases. For example,  a 
classic example of SDT is the use of radar to detect approaching objects; when an object 
appears on the radar screen, the operator must make a decision as to whether or not the 
object could be a potential threat. If the object is deemed to be a threat by the operator 
and the object is in reality threatening, this is considered a hit. If the object is deemed to 
be a threat by the operator but the object is in reality non-threatening, this is considered a 
false-alarm. However, a radar operator can choose to assume that every object detected 
is threatening and thus never allow a threatening object to approach at the cost of 
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wasting resources on non-threatening objects. Thus, SDT allows for a comprehensive 
evaluation of potential response bias. 
In the first phase of the eyes task (perception), “signal” refers to the presence of a 
negative emotional expression, with a low C interpreted as a tendency to over-perceive 
negative emotion due to a lower threshold. In the second phase (memory), “signal” 
refers to an eyes-photograph which had been presented previously in the perception task, 
with a low C interpreted as a tendency to more often endorse a stimulus as having been 
shown before. 
In addition to SDT, a straight-forward examination of both the overall percentage 
of stimuli that were correctly identified (accuracy) as well as the overall percentage of 
stimuli positively endorsed (potential bias) was conducted for both the perception and 
memory tasks. This was done as a comparison to the SDT method of assessing for 
sensitivity and bias, as SDT separates participants into four groups whereas this method 
only separates participants into two groups (in the case of accuracy, correct vs. incorrect; 
in the case of potential bias, higher than 50% positively endorsed vs. at or below 50%) 
and can provide additional information about the sample characteristics in addition to 
SDT data. 
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3.  RESULTS 
 
In order to determine the effectiveness of the mood induction tasks, a comparison 
of the two PANAS administrations as well as the three administrations of the SAM 
scales was conducted. Within the experimental group, the PANAS negative affect results 
indicated that the negative mood induction was ineffective, as the mean of the Time 1 
PANAS (M = 20.70, SD = 6.55) was not significantly different from the mean of the 
Time 2 PANAS (M = 20.17, SD = 6.99). Within the control group, the PANAS negative 
affect results indicated that the neutral mood induction succeeded in that it did not cause 
any significant increase or decrease in mood state from Time 1 (M = 22.65, SD = 8.63) 
to Time 2 (M = 21.71, SD = 9.05).  
The SAM scales, however, indicated that the negative mood induction was 
effective at reducing happiness; a paired-samples t-test, t(105) = -13.52, p< .000, showed 
that the experimental group’s mean Time 1 SAM for Happiness (M = 3.34, SD = 1.88) 
was significantly lower than the mean Time 2 SAM for Happiness (M = 6.34, SD = 
1.87), suggesting that the negative mood induction succeeded in decreasing participants’ 
overall level of self-reported happiness. In addition, the SAM scales indicated that 
Arousal also increased following the negative mood induction; a paired-samples t-test, 
t(105) = 5.02, p<.000, showed that the experimental group’s mean Time 1 SAM for 
Arousal (M = 6.45, SD = 2.03) was significantly higher than their mean Time 2 SAM for 
Arousal (M = 5.01, SD = 2.26), suggesting that the mood induction task increased 
participants’ overall level of self-reported arousal. However, the control group’s level of 
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self-reported happiness at Time 1 (M = 3.59, SD = 1.63) followed a similar pattern, 
t(106) = -3.66, p<.000, of decreasing at Time 2 (M = 4.19, SD = 1.49) as in the 
experimental group, suggesting that the decrease in self-reported happiness following the 
negative mood induction may be influenced by task-related effects. For example, the 
completion of the task itself may be experienced as boring to a participant, and thus 
reduce their level of happiness regardless of the valence of the mood induction. Arousal 
in the control group did not follow the same pattern as in the experimental group, 
however, as participants’ level of self-reported arousal in the control group decreased 
slightly from Time 1 (M = 6.21, SD = 1.98) to Time 2 (M = 6.80, SD = 1.85) following 
the neutral mood induction. However, while statistically significant, t(106) = -3.48, p = 
.001, this difference is negligible. 
Because the PANAS and SAM results differ slightly in their indications of the 
effectiveness of the negative mood induction at inducing a negative mood, a between-
groups analysis of performance was conducted to determine if group membership 
affected task performance on the perception task. A one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant differences between groups on overall percent of stimuli correct (F(1, 211) = 
.062, p = .804), overall percent of stimuli endorsed as negative (F(1, 211) = .003, p = 
.958), d' (F(1, 211) = .000, p = .986), or C (F(1, 211) = .002, p = .968). These results 
suggest that the mood induction had no effect on task performance for the perception 
task. Because this suggests a lack of any effect of the experimental manipulation, the 
two groups were collapsed, and all further analyses reflect results combined across mood 
manipulation groups. A table of means for this collapsed group is presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for all Test Variables 
Measure Mean SD 
SAM Time 1 Happiness 3.46 1.76 
SAM Time 1 Arousal 6.33 2.00 
SAM Time 2 Happiness 5.26 2.00 
SAM Time 2 Arousal 5.91 2.25 
SAM Time 3 Happiness 4.56 1.51 
SAM Time 3 Arousal 6.12 1.83 
T BOR 53.90 9.95 
T BOR-A 51.03 10.24 
T BOR-I 55.56 10.05 
T BOR-N 52.82 10.16 
T BOR-S 52.70 11.78 
PANAS Time 1 Positive Affect 33.23 6.78 
PANAS Time 1 Negative Affect 21.68 7.71 
PANAS Time 2 Positive Affect 32.11 7.47 
PANAS Time 2 Negative Affect 20.94 8.11 
TAS-20 Difficulty Describing Feelings 12.47 3.69 
TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying Feelings 14.97 5.14 
TAS-20 Externally-Oriented Thinking 20.54 3.43 
TAS-20 Overall Alexithymia 47.98 9.51 
Perception Task Accuracy 72.24% 10.13% 
Perception Task Percent Negative 44.84% 12.55% 
Perception Task d' .827 .868 
Perception Task C 1.02 .656 
Memory Task Accuracy 61.88% 8.25% 
Memory Task Percent "Seen Before" 69.02% 14.95% 
Memory Task d' .335 .185 
Memory Task C .426 .222 
Note.N = 211 
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The next analysis focused on any potential effects of high-BOR vs. low-BOR on 
task performance for the perception task and the memory task. For the perception task, a 
cut-off of 70T (as used by Trull, 1995) was used to separate participants in high-BOR (n 
= 20) or low-BOR (n = 193) groups revealed no significant differences for overall 
percent of stimuli correct (F(1, 211) = 1.15, p = .285), overall percent of stimuli 
endorsed as negative (F(1, 211) = .684, p = .409), d' (F(1, 211) = .005, p = .943), or C 
(F(1, 211) = .299, p = .585), suggesting that there was no effect of high-BOR or low-
BOR group membership on perception task performance. Likewise, for the memory 
task, BOR group membership had no effect on overall percent of stimuli correct (F(1, 
211) = .026, p = .872), overall percent of stimuli endorsed as having been shown 
previously (F(1, 211) = .264, p = .608), d' (F(1, 211) = .001, p = .971), or C (F(1, 211) = 
.168, p = .682). Taken together, these results suggest that categorically examining the 
effects of borderline personality features does not have any discernible effect on the 
ability to accurately perceive emotion in others. However, it is worth noting that the 
number of participants in the low-BOR group was far greater than the number of 
participants in the high-BOR group, although this is to be expected, as a BOR score 
above 70T indicates a clinical level of borderline personality features, and the sample 
was taken from undergraduate students who would be expected to be primarily sub-
clinical.  
Because the results indicated that a categorical examination of borderline 
personality features failed to highlight any effects on task performance, and because 
borderline personality features function on a continuum, correlational statistics were 
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obtained for all further analyses in an attempt to illuminate any potential effects of either 
personality or affective state on task performance. The full results of this correlational 
analysis are presented in Table 2 for the perception task, and Table 3 for the memory 
task. Although modest, there were significant correlations between overall level of 
borderline personality features and the tendency to endorse stimuli as negative in the 
perception task, r(211) = .168, p = .014, as well as between affective instability and the 
tendency to endorse stimuli as negative in the perception task, r(211) = .166, p = .015, 
suggesting a possible negative response bias in those with higher levels of borderline 
personality features. In addition, on the perception task, self-harm correlates modestly 
and inversely with overall accuracy, r(211) = -.144, p = .035, the tendency to endorse 
stimuli as negative, r(211) = -.190, p = .005, d', r(211) = -.217, p = .001, and C, r(211) = 
-.219, p = .001. This suggests that the self-harm aspect of borderline personality may 
play a significant role in emotion perception among those high in borderline personality 
features. There were no discernible relationships between the TAS-20 and task 
performance. 
With regards to affective state, the results suggest that a participant's level of 
self-reported happiness (as measured by the SAM) at the start of the study was modestly 
correlated with their overall accuracy on the perception task, r(211) = .181, p = .008, 
although there was no effect on the memory task, r(211) = .004, p = .991). Due to the 
nature of the response scale for the Happiness SAM, the positive correlation obtained for 
the perception task indicates that participants who reported lower happiness at the 
beginning of the study were slightly more accurate on the perception task. Additionally,  
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Table 2 
Correlational Analyses for Perception Task 
Measure Accuracy Percent negative d' C 
SAM Time 1 Happiness .181** .107 .091 .016 
SAM Time 1 Arousal .097 -.009 -.020 -.037 
SAM Time 2 Happiness .044 .091 -.015 -.052 
SAM Time 2 Arousal -.003 -.005 -.022 -.013 
SAM Time 3 Happiness .121 .104 .010 -.049 
SAM Time 3 Arousal .033 .053 -.058 -.072 
T BOR .026 .168* -.059 -.108 
T BOR-A .065 .166* -.048 -.106 
T BOR-I .024 .134 .017 -.030 
T BOR-N .121 .029 .055 .012 
T BOR-S -.144* .190** -.217** -.219** 
PANAS Time 1 Positive Affect -.131 .036 -.160* -.131 
PANAS Time 1 Negative Affect .128 .102 .058 -.004 
PANAS Time 2 Positive Affect -.118 .032 -.163* -.137* 
PANAS Time 2 Negative Affect .073 .135* -.006 -.059 
TAS-20 Difficulty Describing Feelings -.028 .126 .015 -.017 
TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying Feelings .014 .090 -.019 -.046 
TAS-20 Externally-Oriented Thinking -.114 .048 -.104 -.085 
TAS-20 Overall Alexithymia -.044 .115 -.042 -.062 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01 
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Table 3 
Correlational Analyses for Memory Task 
Measure Accuracy 
Percent "Seen 
Before" d' C 
SAM Time 1 Happiness .004 -.055 .026 .058 
SAM Time 1 Arousal .073 -.103 .086 .105 
SAM Time 2 Happiness -.065 .102 -.077 -.104 
SAM Time 2 Arousal .104 -.115 .118 .119 
SAM Time 3 Happiness .032 .018 .033 -.016 
SAM Time 3 Arousal .125 -.128 .131 .131 
T BOR -.018 .069 -.029 -.072 
T BOR-A .017 .076 .005 -.074 
T BOR-I .057 .067 .032 -.072 
T BOR-N -.093 .122 -.110 -.129 
T BOR-S -.040 -.064 -.020 .062 
PANAS Time 1 Positive Affect -.076 -.006 -.085 .000 
PANAS Time 1 Negative Affect -.054 .095 -.071 -.102 
PANAS Time 2 Positive Affect -.047 .004 -.062 -.008 
PANAS Time 2 Negative Affect -.102 .171* -.124 -.176** 
TAS-20 Difficulty Describing Feelings -.011 .033 -.012 -.035 
TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying Feelings .008 .104 -.003 -.100 
TAS-20 Externally-Oriented Thinking -.063 -.052 -.048 .052 
TAS-20 Overall Alexithymia -.023 .050 -.024 -.049 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01 
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positive affect at the start of the study (as measured by the PANAS at Time 1) 
was weakly negatively correlated with d' on the perception task, r(211) = -.160, p = .020, 
which also suggests that increased positive affect negatively impacted performance on 
the perception task. Following the mood induction task and immediately preceding the 
perception task itself, there is further evidence to suggest that negative affect increases 
performance on the perception task, as positive affect (as measured by the PANAS at 
Time 2) weakly negatively correlated with both d’, r(211) = .162, p = .018, and C, 
r(211) = -.137, p = .046.  
There was also a suggestion that negative affect (as measured by the PANAS at 
Time 2) immediately preceding the perception task may result in a slightly higher 
tendency to endorse perception task stimuli as negative, r(211) = .135, p = .050. In 
addition, negative affect immediately preceding the perception task was also weakly 
positively correlated with a greater tendency to endorse stimuli as having been shown 
previously on the memory task, r(211) = .171, p = .013, as well as weakly negatively 
correlated with C, r(211) = -.176, p = .010, suggesting that negative affect may play a 
role in potential response biases in the memory of emotional stimuli. 
As past research on the effects of mood and personality traits on memory is 
limited, the current study was also interested in examining any effects that emotional 
valence might play on memory. Thus, the memory task was also examined through a 
break-down of emotional valence, with a separate group for negative stimuli and neutral 
stimuli, allowing separate performance results to be obtained for each group. Table 4 
lists the obtained correlations when solely examining negative stimuli, and Table 5 lists  
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Table 4 
Correlational Analyses for Memory Task: Negative Affect 
Measure Accuracy Percent "Seen Before" d' C 
SAM Time 1 Happiness -.010 -.043 .067 .083 
SAM Time 1 Arousal .060 -.147* .117 .156* 
SAM Time 2 Happiness -.101 .134 -.109 -.127 
SAM Time 2 Arousal .049 -.119 .118 .145* 
SAM Time 3 Happiness .027 .050 .001 -.042 
SAM Time 3 Arousal .055 -.116 .125 .147* 
T BOR .015 .084 .006 -.053 
T BOR-A .050 .086 .050 -.033 
T BOR-I .073 .046 -.004 -.060 
T BOR-N -.074 .177* -.096 -.156* 
T BOR-S -.040 -.064 -.020 .062 
PANAS Time 1 Positive Affect -.074 .040 -.069 -.047 
PANAS Time 1 Negative Affect .001 .046 -.054 -.070 
PANAS Time 2 Positive Affect -.052 .070 -.104 -.102 
PANAS Time 2 Negative Affect -.046 .120 -.081 -.118 
TAS-20 Difficulty Describing Feelings .027 -.031 .065 .058 
TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying Feelings .042 .078 .085 .002 
TAS-20 Externally-Oriented Thinking -.071 -.095 .028 .109 
TAS-20 Overall Alexithymia .007 -.004 .081 .063 
Note. *p<.05 
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Table 5 
Correlational Analyses for Memory Task: Neutral Affect 
Measure Accuracy Percent "Seen Before" d' C 
SAM Time 1 Happiness .019 -.047 .013 .021 
SAM Time 1 Arousal .058 -.032 .048 .036 
SAM Time 2 Happiness .005 .042 .055 .003 
SAM Time 2 Arousal .125 -.075 .057 .035 
SAM Time 3 Happiness .024 -.017 -.001 -.004 
SAM Time 3 Arousal .154* -.099 .131 .090 
T BOR -.048 .033 -.040 -.035 
T BOR-A -.028 .042 -.015 -.035 
T BOR-I .015 .065 -.009 -.069 
T BOR-N -.075 .035 -.053 -.022 
T BOR-S -.061 -.048 -.047 .023 
PANAS Time 1 Positive Affect -.046 -.045 .009 .072 
PANAS Time 1 Negative Affect -.096 .110 -.094 -.111 
PANAS Time 2 Positive Affect -.022 -.056 .024 .080 
PANAS Time 2 Negative Affect -.124 .162* -.124 -.154* 
TAS-20 Difficulty Describing Feelings -.050 .078 -.059 -.082 
TAS-20 Difficulty Identifying Feelings -.035 .094 -.083 -.107 
TAS-20 Externally-Oriented Thinking -.026 .002 -.055 -.014 
TAS-20 Overall Alexithymia -.048 .082 -.088 -.095 
Note. *p<.05 
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the obtained correlations when solely examining neutral stimuli. Of note, the results for 
negative stimuli showed that the SAM Arousal scale was correlated positively with C at 
all administrations including Time 1, r(211) = .156, p = .023, Time 2, r(211) = .145, p = 
.034, and Time 3, r(211) = .147, p = .032, suggesting that lower arousal levels are 
related to a higher criterion being needed to endorse a negative stimulus as having been 
seen before. SAM Arousal also correlated negatively with percentage of stimuli 
endorsed as having been seen before regardless of its novelty, particularly at Time 1, 
r(211) = -.147, p = .032, and less significantly with Time 2, r(211) = -.119, p = .082, and 
Time 3, r(211) = -.116, p = .092, suggesting that lower levels of arousal are related to a 
reduced percentage of negative stimuli endorsed as having been seen before. 
In addition to arousal, there was a significant effect for BOR-N. BOR-N was 
positively correlated with the percentage of stimuli endorsed as having been seen before 
regardless of its novelty, r(211) = .177, p=.010, although negatively correlated with C, 
r(211) = -.156, p=.023. These results suggest that the negative relationships component 
of BPD may play a role in memory bias for negative affect. 
For neutral stimuli in the memory task, there were fewer significant findings, 
although the SAM Arousal scale, particularly at Time 3, r(211) = .154, p=.025, was 
positively correlated with greater overall accuracy for the neutral stimuli in the memory 
task, suggesting that higher levels of self-reported arousal were related to poorer 
accuracy. Additionally, the PANAS negative affect scale correlated both with the 
percentage of stimuli endorsed as having been seen before regardless of its novelty, 
r(211) = .162, p=.018, as well as with C for neutral stimuli, r(211) = -.154, p=.025. 
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These results suggest that negative affect may play a role in the memory of neutral 
stimuli. 
Overall, the dependent measures of mood and personality traits correlated in a 
predictable fashion (see Table 6). For example, the SAM Happiness scale at Time 1 has 
a strong negative correlation with PANAS Positive Affect at Time 1, r(211) = -.521, p< 
.000, as well as a positive correlation with PANAS Negative Affect at Time 1 r(211) = 
.478, p < .000. In addition, and in support of a higher baseline of negative affect in those 
with BPD, PANAS Negative Affect strongly correlated with the PAI-BOR, r(211) = 
.639, p < .000, as well as lower self-reported SAM Happiness at Time 1, r(211) = .463, p 
< .000. In addition, the PAI-BOR correlated strongly with the TAS-20, r(211) = .535, p 
< .000, with a positive correlation between overall level of self-reported borderline 
personality features and self-reported difficulty with identifying feelings, r(211) = .605, 
p < .000. 
Though not central to the main hypotheses, the results of the present study also 
highlight an intriguing effect of gender. For overall accuracy on the perception task, 
female participants (M = 75.0%, SD = 8.90%) were significantly more accurate than 
male participants (M = 70.4%, SD = 11.46%), t(172) = -2.97, p = .003. Consistent with 
these findings, female participants (M = 1.05, SD = 1.03) also obtained significantly 
higher d' scores than male participants (M = .676, SD = .689), t(172) = -2.68, p = .008. 
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Table 6 
Correlational Analyses of Personality and Mood Measures 
  
SAM T1 
H 
SAM T1 
A 
SAM T2 
H 
SAM T2 
A 
SAM T3 
H 
SAM T3 
A 
T  
BOR 
T  
BOR 
A 
T  
BOR 
I 
T  
BOR 
N 
T 
BOR 
S 
PANAS 
T1 PA 
PANAS 
T1 NA 
PANAS 
T2 PA 
PANAS 
T2 NA 
TAS 
20 DDF 
TAS 
20 DIF 
TAS 
20 EOT 
TAS 
20 Total 
SAM T1 
H -- -.076 .232** .018 .467** .031 .463** .489** .388** .409** .103 -.521** .478** -.459** .470** .308** .363** .018 .322** 
SAM T1 
A 
 
-- .031 .232** -.046 .509** -.215** -.163* -.219** -.124 -.147* -.111 -.185** -.127 -.214** -.150* -.228** .096 -.147* 
SAM T2 
H 
  
-- -.464** .469** -.198** .097 .100 .112 .078 .002 -.066 .081 -.043 .092 .015 .059 .026 .047 
SAM T2 
A 
   
-- -.109 .609** -.028 -.021 -.118 .035 .019 -.053 -.046 -.097 -.085 .023 .064 -.012 .039 
SAM T3 
H 
    
-- -.196** .293** .232** .312** .248** .087 -.303** .250** -.275** .276** .094 .183** -.055 .116 
SAM T3 
A 
     
-- -.072 -.010 -.138* -.002 -.074 -.048 -.045 -.114 -.098 -.041 -.073 .069 -.030 
T BOR 
      
-- .846** .822** .825** .538** -.266** .639** -.280** .604** .508** .605** .032 .535** 
T BOR-A 
       
-- .644** .620** .275** -.288** .626** -.314** .599** .459** .558** .071 .505** 
T BOR-I 
        
-- .638** .183** -.313** .561** -.340** .539** .465** .569** -.088 .456** 
T BOR-N 
         
-- .237** -.231** .520** -.261** .483** .344** .473** -.151* .334** 
T BOR-S 
          
-- .045 .214** .092 .195** .267** .222** .285** .326** 
PANAS 
T1 PA 
           
-- -.216** .875** -.228** -.233** -.284** -.027 -.253** 
PANAS 
T1 NA 
            
-- -.298** .892** .441** .482** -.061 .410** 
PANAS 
T2 PA 
             
-- -.294** -.284** -.325** .027 -.276** 
PANAS 
T2 NA 
              
-- .378** .430** -.039 .365** 
TAS-20 
DDF 
               
-- .743** .281** .891** 
TAS-20 
DIF 
                
-- .096 .863** 
TAS-20 
EOT 
                 
-- .522** 
TAS-20 
Total 
                  
-- 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01 
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4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The research on borderline personality disorder and emotion regulation has 
become one of the most debated topics in modern clinical psychology. It is clear that a 
better understanding of the mechanisms behind the affective problems experienced by 
those with BPD will likely lead to more effective treatments and perhaps greater insight 
into the genesis of the disorder, and thus emotion regulation has risen to the forefront of 
interest for researchers of BPD. The goal of this study was to examine the influences of 
personality trait (as relevant to Borderline Personality) and mood state upon the 
perception and memory of interpersonal emotions. However, the mood state aspects of 
the study could not be answered as it appeared that the mood induction selected failed to 
have the hypothesized effect upon mood state.  Mood induction tasks have a long history 
of use in psychological research, although their validity and effectiveness have varied, 
particularly according to the type of mood induction procedure utilized (Gerrards-Hesse, 
Spies, & Hesse, 1994). However, previous reviews of mood induction procedures have 
concluded that mood induction procedures can be highly effective under the right 
conditions and with the right stimulation (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, & Hesse, 1994; 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hess, 1996).  
Unfortunately, the guided-imagery mood induction procedure used here proved 
ineffective at inducing the intended mood state (in this case, negative emotion), although 
there are a number of possible explanations for this result.When comparing the effects of 
the mood induction in the present study to the very similarly designed research by 
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Robins (1988) or Dixon-Gordon et al. (2011), one of the most noticeable discrepancies 
lies with the effect sizes of the mood induction. One important consideration is the 
influence of task demand effects as a possible explanation for these discrepancies. 
Demand effects refer to the tendency for research participants to behave as they feel they 
are expected to in a research setting. For example, a research participant taking part in a 
study examining the effects of anger on a prisoner’s dilemma task may guess that the 
mood induction procedure is supposed to induce anger, and so they act in accordance 
with this and effectively “pretend” that they are angry. Because this anger is artificial, 
demand effects have the potential to severely impact the validity of mood induction 
tasks. Demand effects are often present and sometimes even unavoidable in mood 
induction tasks, primarily due to the obvious nature of the content of the task. For 
example, many participants in a research study would be able to deduce that the study 
was supposed to make them feel sad if they are asked to watch a particularly sad film 
clip. In addition, many of the most commonly used mood induction procedures in past 
research explicitly direct the participant to adopt a specific emotional state, which makes 
the purpose of the research very clear to the participant (Westermann et al., 1996). 
Because demand effects are likely to vary between studies and research settings, this 
could help account for the present study’s discrepancies from the effects found by 
Robins (1988) and Dixon-Gordon et al. (2011), as this could have resulted in decreased 
demand effects in the current study. Reduced demand effects could potentially result in 
lower effect sizes, as Westermann et al. (1996) found that effect sizes were often smaller 
in mood induction procedures without demand effects. 
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In addition to demand effects, research has shown that certain mood induction 
techniques often lack emotional specificity, and that an induction procedure designed to 
elicit sadness may also elicit anger (Martin, 1990; Westermann et al., 1996). Because 
these two emotions are both negative and conceptually linked, this could negatively 
impact a task which does not control for the effects of anger in addition to sadness. For 
example, a research study intending to induce sadness in participants and includes a 
measure of self-reported anger or arousal (such as the Arousal SAM used here) would be 
better able to conclude about the effects of sadness on performance or behavior. 
Additionally, cognitive psychological and self-control literature has consistently found 
that individuals who experience a negative mood state will often take steps to decrease 
or eliminate this negative mood state by engaging in coping strategies designed to induce 
a more positive mood (Affleck & Tennen, 1996; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000; Mayer & 
Stevens, 1994; Seeman & Schwarz, 1974; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2011). The finding 
that the PANAS negative affect scale correlated with a slight bias towards endorsing the 
stimuli as having been seen before offers some support for the theory that participants in 
a negative mood state may engage in cognitive coping strategies designed to alleviate 
this negative affect and induce more neutral or positive mood states, as mood-
congruency effects would predict that those individuals who were engaging in coping 
strategies designed to shift from a negative mood state to a more neutral mood state 
would likely try to remember more neutral events to overcome this negative affect, and 
thus be more likely to endorse neutral stimuli on the memory task as having been seen 
before. 
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Thus, in the current study, it is reasonable to assume that in the event that 
participants experienced increased negative affect as a result of the negative mood 
induction, they would likely have taken steps to counter this mood and possibly 
compensated by increasing their level of neutral or positive affect. This hypothesis has 
some support with the current data, as the PANAS indicated that overall negative affect 
did not increase following the negative mood induction, and although the SAM 
Happiness scaleindicated that the negative mood induction did succeed in reducing 
participants’ overall level of self-reported happiness, this effect was present for both the 
experimental and control groups and may not have been the result of the valence of the 
mood induction. Because happiness is only one component of positive affect, it is also 
possible that participants experienced decreased happiness as a result of the negative 
mood induction and thus activated other positive affective coping strategies in order to 
reduce the impact of a negative mood state. 
Other possible explanations for the failure of the experimental manipulation 
include the possibility that the mood induction procedure itself was flawed, or that 
participants simply did not exert enough effort towards the internalization of the 
negative affect from the guided-imagery script. With regards to the mood induction 
procedure, the guided-imagery script was adapted from research by Robins (1988) and 
Dixon-Gordon et al. (2011) which both found good overall effect sizes of this mood 
induction procedure at inducing negative mood, although the present procedure was not 
identical. In Robins’ (1988) (as well as later in Dixon-Gordon et al., 2011) original 
study, participants listened to one of two different audio recordings of a social-rejection 
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scenario designed to elicit overall negative mood, with the only difference between tapes 
being references to gender (i.e., male participants received an audio recording in which 
they are rejected by a female partner, and female participants received an audio 
recording in which they are rejected by a male partner), without accounting for 
participants who identify as homosexual. In an attempt to eliminate the use of multiple 
audio recordings in the current study design and to allow for participants who identify as 
homosexual, the guided-imagery script was modified to use gender-neutral terminology 
(i.e., “significant other” instead of “boyfriend” or “girlfriend”). This presented an 
additional problem with regards to the original script, as Robins’ (1988) script described 
a rejection scenario in which the participant calls their significant other and another 
person of the same sex as the participant answers the telephone. When using gender-
neutral terms, the script would have become overly complicated and confusing when 
using the same scenario, and so the rejection scenario was modified and updated to 
describe the participant discovering flirtatious text messages on the cell phone of their 
significant other after being asked by their significant other to check something on the 
cell phone. Though the tone and scenarios between Robins’ (1988) study and the current 
study were designed to be as similar as possible, these necessary modifications could 
have potentially altered the effectiveness of the negative mood induction overall. 
With regards to participant effort, due to the nature of the recruiting method 
(recruiting participants from a psychology subject pool of undergraduate students), 
sufficient effort for successful mood induction may not have been exerted by 
participants, who were selected from an undergraduate subject pool and may primarily 
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be extrinsically motivated rather than intrinsically motivated. The guided-imagery script 
relies heavily on participant motivation to engage in active immersion in the described 
scenario in order to induce negative emotion. Thus, limited effort or attention during the 
presentation of the guided-imagery script could also result in a lack of effect from the 
mood induction procedure. 
Though the experimental mood manipulation proved ineffective, the current 
study was still informative with respect to the influence of traits upon emotional 
information processing. The PANAS showed several weak correlations between affect 
and task performance. The correlation between negative affect and the overall tendency 
to endorse stimuli as negative on the perception task provides some support for 
affecteffects on emotion perception bias. With regards to positive affect, self-reported 
positive affect following the mood induction task was associated with poorer perception 
task accuracy. Though memory effects were modest, there was an association between 
negative affect following the mood induction procedure and a bias towards endorsing 
stimuli as having been seen before. 
In addition, the results of the current research suggest that there were several 
intriguing effects of borderline personality features on task performance which may help 
elucidate certain points of disagreement regarding BPD and emotion perception that has 
been frequently encountered in past research on the topic.Trull (1995) had success in 
comparing the borderline personality features in undergraduate students through the use 
of categorical designations of those high in borderline features and those low in 
borderline features using a cut score of ≥70T on the PAI-BOR. However, this result did 
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not replicate for the present research, possibly due to an insufficient sample size for 
those in the high-BOR group. The PAI-BOR, however, allows for a continuous 
examination of the level of self-reported borderline personality features due to its use of 
T-scores, and so correlational analyses were possible to determine if, in general, higher 
levels of self-reported borderline personality features tended to correlate with better or 
worse performance on a facial affect recognition task. The results indicated that there 
was an effect of level of borderline personality features on response bias for the 
perception task, such that higher levels of borderline personality features resulted in a 
greater tendency to interpret facial affect stimuli as negative, regardless of its actual 
emotional valence as negative or neutral. Though this is a weak correlation, it does 
provide support for previous research which has found that individuals with BPD tend to 
perceive ambiguous stimuli as more negative than in they are in reality (Scott et al., 
2011). 
The PAI-BOR provides a significant benefit for a more thorough examination of 
this effect due to its composition of four subscales which each represent distinct areas of 
borderline personality pathology. Almost all of the prior research on BPD and emotion 
perception has focused on BPD from a holistic perspective, usually requiring BPD 
participants to meet DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria for 
borderline personality disorder. However, there is considerable overlap amongst 
different personality disorders, and much recent research has focused on the problems 
inherent with a categorical model of personality disorders, characterizing them instead as 
dimensions of pathological personality (Krueger, Eaton, Derringer, Markon, Watson, 
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&Skodol, 2011; Skodol, Bender, Morey, Clark, Oldham, Alarcon, Krueger, … Siever, 
2011; Skodol, Clark, Bender, Krueger, Morey, Verheul, Alarcon, … Oldham, 2011; 
Trull & Durrett, 2005; Widiger & Simonsen, 2005; Widiger & Trull, 2007). Currently, 
the DSM-IV-TR lists diagnostic criteria for BPD as requiring five of nine separate 
criteria for a diagnosis. However, since any five of the nine criteria are adequate for a 
diagnosis of BPD, there is much heterogeneity within the disorder itself (Trull & Durrett, 
2005). For example, one individual with a diagnosis of BPD may exhibit (1) efforts to 
avoid abandonment, (2) unstable interpersonal relationships, (3) disturbed identity, (4) 
self-damaging impulsivity, and (5) suicidal ideation, while a separate individual who 
shares a diagnosis of BPD exhibits (1) suicidal ideation, (2) affective instability, (3) 
chronic feelings of emptiness, (4) inappropriate anger, and (5) dissociative symptoms 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Though these two individuals share a 
diagnosis, the manner of the disorder’s expression varies greatly between these 
individuals. Thus, existing research on emotion perception in BPD based on the DSM-
IV-TR’s current categorical model of diagnosis would fail to take into account this 
heterogeneity within BPD, and thus a possible explanation for the conflicting results of 
such research could be that there is a specific component(s) of BPD that would play a 
more influential role in emotion perception abilities in those with BPD than another 
component(s) might. 
In the present study, the PAI-BOR’s subscales (BOR-A, BOR-I, BOR-N, and 
BOR-S) reflect this variability within BPD and allows for a more detailed examination 
of how different aspects of BPD affect emotion perception. The results suggest that the 
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affective instability component of BPD (BOR-A), which reflects frequently shifting 
negative emotions, may be partially associated with the slight negativity bias seen when 
comparing high-BOR participants’ performance on the perception task. This makes 
conceptual sense, as BOR-A is a measure of unstable emotions and would suggest that 
the ability of someone high on BOR-A to accurately perceive the emotional state of 
other individuals would also be unstable. In addition to BOR-A, self-harming 
impulsivity (BOR-S) also appears to have a strong influence on emotion perception 
abilities. The strongest correlations in the current study were found between BOR-S and 
d’ and C for the perception task, although BOR-S is also significantly correlated with 
overall accuracy and the tendency to endorse stimuli as negative on the perception task. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the impulsivity aspect of borderline personality 
disorder may be a critical component of emotion perception in BPD. This is an 
intriguing result in the context of this research, as it suggests that impulsivity may play 
an important role in adding to the understanding of how individuals with BPD perceive 
the emotional states of others. Because impulsivity would be expected to vary amongst 
those with a diagnosis of BPD (with some individuals being highly impulsive while 
others express their pathology in other ways), this suggests that previous research on 
emotion perception in BPD which failed to account for impulsivity may have overlooked 
a critical variable in the exploration of perception abilities in BPD, and that impulsivity 
may help account for why reports of accuracy advantages and reports of accuracy 
disadvantages exist simultaneously (Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; Lynch et al., 2006; 
Wagner & Linehan, 1999). 
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The research on impulsivity in BPD (and impulsivity in general) has consistently 
shown that impulsivity tends to be a stable, biologically-based trait which can have 
severe negative impacts on an individual’s well-being (Berlin & Rolls, 2004; Berlin, 
Rolls, & Iversen, 2005; Bornovalova, LeJuez, Daughters, Rosenthal, & Lynch, 2005; 
LeJuez, Magidson, Mitchell, Sinha, Stevens, & de Wit, 2010; Links, Heslegrave, & van 
Reekum, 1999). Research has also shown that BPD and ADHD share many qualities, 
particularly with regards to affective instability and impulsivity, and that adults with 
BPD often experienced ADHD symptoms in childhood (Davids & Gastpar, 2005; 
Fossati, Novella, Donati, Donini, & Maffei, 2002; Philipsen, 2006; Philipsen, 
Limberger, Lieb, Feige, Kleindienst, Ebner-Priemer, Barth, ... Bohus, 2008). Of 
particular interest to the current study, research on ADHD and emotion perception has 
consistently shown deficits in those with ADHD, especially when tasked with 
recognizing emotion from facial expressions (Da Fonseca, Seguier, Santos, Poinso, & 
Deruelle, 2009; Rapport, Friedman, Tzelepis, & Van Voorhis, 2002; Uekermann, 
Kraemer, Abdel-Hamid, Schimmelmann, Hebebrand, Daum, Wiltfang, & Kis, 2010). As 
both BPD and ADHD share many conceptually similar symptoms, this evidence lends 
support to the idea that impulsivity in BPD may be a driving force behind deficits in 
emotion recognition. 
In regards to the memory task, although there was not much of significance 
identified in the current study, there did appear to be several modest correlations 
between emotional experience, personality traits, and memory. In particular, participant 
arousal played a role in how discriminative participants tended to be for both negative 
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and neutral stimuli. This is intriguing, as “arousal” in the current context refers not to 
any specific emotional state, but rather to a somewhat more vague sense of alertness and 
excitement. However, though it may seem that a higher state of alertness during the 
perception task may increase performance on the memory task, the opposite is true in the 
current study. In other words, the greater the level of self-reported arousal participants 
experienced, the more likely they were to endorse the negative memory stimuli as 
having been seen before, regardless of its novelty. Much of the research literature 
supports the idea that emotional arousal during the encoding of an event has a significant 
impact on retrieval, particularly with regards to detailed memory (Bradley, Greenwald, 
Petry, & Lang, 1992; Mather, 2007; Mather, Mitchell, Raye, Novak, Greene, & Johnson, 
2006; Mather & Sutherland, 2009). In the current study, it is possible that participant 
arousal during the perception task (encoding) made all negative stimuli during the 
memory task (retrieval) seem familiar due to the lack of encoding of accurate details. In 
effect, it is possible that participants were encoding the valence of the stimulus more 
strongly than the detailed features of the stimulus, which would make them more likely 
to endorse all negative stimuli as having been seen before regardless of their novelty. 
This seems further supported by the finding that for neutral stimuli on the memory task, 
participants who reported lower levels of arousal were significantly more accurate at 
discriminating between those neutral stimuli which had been seen before and those 
which had not than participants who reported higher levels of arousal. 
When examining memory performance and personality traits, BOR-N correlated 
with a slight bias towards endorsing negative stimuli as having been seen before 
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regardless of its novelty. In other words, participants who scored higher on BOR-N were 
more likely to endorse negative stimuli as having been seen during the perception task 
simply because of its emotional valence as negative. This would suggest that a bias may 
be possible for memory of negative events which is driven by the negative relationships 
component of BPD. This finding fits well with the current understanding of BOR-N, in 
that participants who score high on this subscale report a history of negative 
interpersonal relationships in the past which may make them more susceptible to a 
distorted memory of interpersonal interactions as negative. Thus, in the present study, 
individuals scoring high on BOR-N may have been more likely to endorse negative 
stimuli as having been seen before during the memory task due to their potential lack of 
specificity for negative recall. 
In general, there were strong correlations between dependent measures of mood 
and personality traits in expectable directions. For example, the PANAS and the SAM 
reflected agreement for negative mood, and the PAI-BOR and the TAS-20 reflected 
agreement for difficulties with emotion regulation. In addition, there were several 
indications that theorized associations between personality traits and mood were 
supported in the current data; for example, the PAI-BOR correlated with higher levels of 
self-reported negative affect, which reflects the idea that individuals with higher levels 
of borderline personality experience higher baseline levels of negative mood. These 
results support the idea that the current study was accurately measuring affective state 
and interpersonally problematic personality traits.  
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Gender also influenced the accuracy of participants on the emotion perception 
task. This finding provides further evidence for the possibility of a fundamental 
difference in how men and women perceive emotions, a phenomena which has been 
well-researched (Biele & Grabowska, 2006; Hofer, Siedentopf, Ischebeck, Rettenbacher, 
Verius, Felber, & Fleischhacker, 2006; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2001; Montagne, 
Kessels, Frigerio, de Haan, & Perrett, 2005; Vashkinn, Sundet, Friis, Simonsen, 
Birkenæs, Engh, Jónsdóttir, ... Andreassen, 2007). This is particularly relevant in the 
current context, as it is often estimated that two-thirds of those diagnosed with BPD are 
female (Swartz, Blazer, George, & Winfield, 1990). Thus, the demographic makeup of 
males vs. females in research examining emotion perception in BPD would need to 
account for any potential sex effects, as it is possible that this may help explain some of 
the conflicting results on the topic. 
One potential limitation of the findings of the current study is that most of the 
data analysis consisted of correlational analyses using many different variables. Because 
of this somewhat high number of variables included, it would be expected that certain 
correlations may be due to chance. Specifically, around 5% of the significant 
correlations for the perception, memory, and dependent measures analyses would be 
expected due to Type 1 error. While the number of statistical correlations for the 
perception task is high enough that it would suggest true significance for at least some of 
the variables, the relatively low number for the memory task may instead suggest that 
the few effects that were found for memory may not hold up under study replication. 
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The future direction of this type of research will need to focus on the 
identification of specific characteristics which affect emotion perception abilities among 
those with BPD. The research suggests that BPD is often marked by considerable 
individual differences, both in terms of the heterogeneity of diagnostic criteria and 
among specific characteristics of BPD, such as impulsivity or affective instability. 
Though the current study failed to effectively manipulate participant affect, the theory 
behind this research remains plausible: the greater likelihood of a negative affective state 
at baseline in those with BPD may help account for the variability in research on 
emotion perception in BPD. Future research could attempt to replicate the design of the 
current study with a more effective mood induction procedure (such as movie clips) in 
order to better determine how mood affects emotion perception. In addition, because the 
majority of the significant findings in the present study were correlational, there is a 
need for research to further explore these findings in an attempt to better understand 
borderline personality disorder. As an alternative, future research could attempt to 
induce impulsivity in participants to determine how this affects emotion perception in 
order to further explore the role of impulsivity. 
In conclusion, though the experimental manipulation failed to produce the 
intended effect, the results do provide some support for the idea of personality and mood 
interactions on emotion perception. Because interpersonal interactions are so often the 
cause of distress in those with BPD, a greater understanding of the mechanisms behind 
interpersonal perception is needed to inform treatment methodologies for BPD. The 
results of the present study suggest that the impulsivity component of BPD may play a 
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role in the volatility of interpersonal interactions, and this warrants further exploration. 
The research into emotion perception in BPD remains ongoing, and as more in-depth 
analyses of the influence of specific characteristics of BPD on emotion regulation and 
perception increases, so too will the understanding of the mechanisms behind one of the 
most clinically prevalent and problematic psychological disorders. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Negative Mood Induction Guided-Imagery Script (adapted from Dixon-Gordon et al., 
2011) 
 
Narrator: Please listen to this taped message very carefully. You will hear a 
description of a series of events, and you are to imagine that these things are 
happening toyou. In order to help your imagination, please close your eyes, 
become relaxed and payattention only to this tape. Try to imagine what you hear 
as vividly as you can. Form amental picture of what is described, trying to 
include as much detail as you can. Try toget involved in what you hear, and 
experience how you might feel if this were reallyhappening to you. Imagine 
yourself in this situation. 
 
Narrator: You have been in town for only a short time, and you have found it a difficult 
transition in many ways. In particular, you have been trying to meet people, 
make newfriends, and this has been difficult. Fortunately, you have made a few 
friends, andparticularly important, you have been seeing someoneromantically 
who you like very much, and at thispoint, you feel very committed to them. Last 
night, your romantic partner came over to your apartment to spend some time 
with you, and you were watching a movie together on the couch. At one point, 
your partner got up to use the restroom, and while they were gone their phone, 
which they had left on the coffee table next to the couch, started ringing. Your 
partner called out to ask you to see who was calling, and you did so, and they 
told you it wasn’t important and they would just call back later. However, as you 
were looking at the phone, you noticed a number of missed calls from someone 
you didn’t recognize, which is odd since you know most of your romantic 
partner’s friends. You decided to quickly peek at the phone’s text messages, and 
saw that there were many texts from this same person, all of which referred to 
your romantic partner in a very affectionate way, and one text, which had been 
sent earlier that day, caught your eye, which said:  
“Hey you! I can’t wait to see you again tomorrow night! I still can’t get over how 
much fun we had last week!” 
You put the phone back on the coffee table, and your thoughts were spinning 
with what the texts and calls could mean. At this point, your romantic partner 
came back into the living room, but you were still too confused to bring up the 
messages you’d seen. You continued watching the movie, but you weren’t really 
paying attention, and instead were thinking about those messages. After the 
movie was over, your romantic partner tells you they have to leave since they had 
to be at work early the next morning since they were a bit behind. You casually 
asked if your partner wanted to get together for dinner the following night, but 
they said they couldn’t since they would have to work late as well. You decided 
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not to bring up the messages you’d seen, since you needed some time to think 
about it. 
Now today, you decide to stop by your romantic partner’s workplace with some 
fast food takeout, since they had said they’d be working late and probably 
wouldn’t have time to grab something. When you get to your partner's 
workplace, however, you are told that your partner wasn't working late, and had 
left work at the normal time. Your worst suspicionseems confirmed. You feel 
utterly rejected. 
 
Narrator: After you leave, you decide to go to a coffee shop to get something to 
drink, and hopefully, meet some of your friends to talk to, to take your mind off 
this. Youorder and sit at an empty booth. The booths have high partitions 
between them. As you sitdown, you immediately recognize the voices of the 
people in an adjoining booth. Theyare two friends of yours, and you are about to 
go around and join them when you noticethat they seem to be talking about you, 
so you sit and listen. You realize that your friends are talking about a party you’d 
recently gone to together, and they say they can’t believe how silly you sounded 
in a debate you’d had with another mutual friend, and that you were very 
unaware and close-minded. They say that you are too argumentative, and while 
you can be reasonable sometimes, certain things just get way out of hand. In 
addition, they mention how oblivious you were of other people’s reactions to 
what you were saying, and how it made you look really bad. One of your friends 
mentions that it’s a shame, really, because you can be really nice in some ways, 
but the way you act around others is just going to cause you to lose friends, and 
your other friend agrees.At this point, your friends begin talking about your 
romantic partner. One of your friends says they saw your partner walking down 
the street with their arm around someone, and your other friend says that you 
probably don’t even know what’s going on. Your friends debate telling you about 
it, and mention that though they can understand why your partner would want to 
see someone else, it was still a pretty lousy thing to do behind your back, and 
they feel sorry for you. 
 
Narrator: Now please try to remember the events described on this tape, and 
spend a minute going over them in your mind’s eye. Remember your situation in 
a new town,the cell phone messages you’d seen, the visit to your romantic 
partner’s workplace, and the overheardconversation in the coffee shop. Keep 
your eyes closed, and imagine these events until you’re asked to stop. 
 
[30 second delay] 
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Neutral Mood Induction Guided-Imagery Script (adapted from Tiffany & Drobes, 
1990) 
 
Narrator: Please listen to this taped message very carefully. You will hear a 
description of a series of events, and you are to imagine that these things are 
happening toyou. In order to help your imagination, please close your eyes, 
become relaxed and payattention only to this tape. Try to imagine what you hear 
as vividly as you can. Form amental picture of what is described, trying to 
include as much detail as you can. Try toget involved in what you hear, and 
experience how you might feel if this were reallyhappening to you. Imagine 
yourself in this situation. 
 
Narrator: It is a Saturday morning, and you have just woken up. You go to the kitchen to 
look for something to eat for breakfast, and while you're in the kitchen, you 
notice that one of the light bulbs in the ceiling fixture has burnt out. You drag a 
kitchen chair under the light fixture to change the bulb.  When you stand on the 
chair you can easily reach the screws that hold the fixture on to the ceiling.  You 
start turning one of the screws, and as the glass cover begins to come loose, you 
place your hand over it to hold it in place.  With your free hand you try to turn 
the last screw, but it's on pretty tight and your fingers slip.  You clamp down 
harder this time and give it a good twist.  The screw comes free and you're able 
to slip the cover off.  You place the screws in the cover and climb off the chair.  
Getting back up on the chair, you start to unscrew the old bulb.  It looks old and 
dirty; you're surprised that it hadn't burned out earlier. After putting the old bulb 
in the garbage bin, you get a replacement bulb, get back up on the chair, and 
screw it into place. You then replace the glass cover, get down off the chair, and 
then move the chair back to its usual spot.You then eat breakfast, and since it's 
still morning and you don't have any plans for the day until later in the afternoon, 
you decide to work on some things around your home. There are some dishes in 
the kitchen sink, so you decide to load them into the dishwasher. You start with 
the utensils: forks, spoons, and knives. Next you load the plates. Finally, you 
load the pots, pans, and other dishes into the dishwasher. You add detergent, 
close the door, and turn the dishwasher on. You decide to do your laundry next, 
so you get your laundry and head to the laundromat. Once you get there, you 
begin sorting out your clothes to put into the washing machines.  The place has 
some other people, but it's certainly not too busy, and you are easily able to find 
two machines next to each other that were not being used.  The smell of hot 
exhaust from the dryers fills the air, and noise from the machines covers up the 
sounds from the television turned on in the corner of the room.  You put your 
clothes into the washers and add some soap.  You dig through your pockets for 
change and discover that you don't have enough so you take out a dollar bill and 
walk over to the change machine against the wall.  You feed your bill into the 
changer and quarters spill into the cup below.  Now you'll have plenty of change 
to finish your wash. 
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 While you're waiting for your clothes to finish washing, you decide to head next 
door to a cafe to get lunch. As you enter the cafe, you are surrounded by the sounds of 
dishes being bussed and the conversation of other diners.  The atmosphere in the cafe is 
quite plain; booths with red vinyl seats, brown Formica tables with a metal rack 
containing salt and pepper shakers and toothpicks on one side, and a bottle of ketchup on 
the other.  You order a sandwich and your favorite beverage, which doesn't take long to 
arrive. As you sit and eat, you notice some of the other diners. A family of four, with 
two children, is sitting at a nearby booth. Sitting at the counter of the diner is an elderly 
man engaged in conversation with one of the waitresses, and it seems like the man is 
probably a regular in the cafe who the waitress knows well. After you finish eating, you 
pay your bill and head back to the laundromat to change your clothes over to a dryer. 
While they're drying, you sit in one of the chairs in the corner and look through a pile of 
magazines that are sitting on a coffee table nearby. One of the magazines seems 
interesting, so you flip through it and find a few interesting articles to read. Once you're 
done with the magazine, you look up to the television, which is playing a popular 
sitcom. It's difficult to hear with the sound of the machines, so you turn it up a little with 
a nearby remote control. After a little while, you hear your dryer buzz, which means 
your clothes are done. You open the dryer, gather and fold your clothes, and head back 
home. Once you're back, you put your clean clothes away and decide the only thing left 
that needs to be done is to rake some of the leaves out of the front yard. There's only one 
small tree on the lawn so there's not much raking that needs to be done.  You get a rake 
and start raking them into a small pile. Some of the leaves are wet and matted into the 
grass.  You have to press down hard on the rake to lift these leaves out.  As you rake all 
of the brown leaves into a pile you can smell their musty odor.  You start to feel a little 
warm so you take your jacket off and drape it over one of the branches of the tree.  You 
can feel the wind blowing lightly on your face as you continue raking.  You notice the 
drone of a plane flying right above you.  You lean on your rake and watch as the plane 
flies by. Once you're finished raking, you go back inside and decide to just relax for a 
while until you're ready to go out and meet your friends in the afternoon. 
 
Narrator: Now please try to remember the events described on this tape, and 
spend a minute going over them in your mind’s eye. Remember changing the 
light bulb, filling the dishwasher, taking your clothes to the laundromat, eating 
lunch at the cafe, and raking the leaves. Keep your eyes closed, and imagine 
these events until you’re asked to stop. 
 
[30 second delay] 
